This paper examines the macroeconomic e¤ects of youth unemployment programmes in the form of vocational training (YUPs), developing a two sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker-rm wage bargaining for skilled workers. Unskilled sector wages are indexed to skilled sector wages. Workers di¤er with respect to ability, having importance for the young workers skill decision. Furthermore, a young worker may be o¤ered vocational training through YUPs. The total number of skilled workers is therefore determined by these two channels and the interaction between them. We focus on the impact of of YUPs on skill division, unemployment distribution workers and aggregate unemployment.
Introduction
During the last decade of the former century, a huge amount of both theoretical and This paper examines another potential e¤ect of Active Labour Market Policy. We consider training programmes o¤ering vocational training to non-educated young workers.
A number of European countries have introduced such programmes. The programmes should in theory be perfect substitutes for ordinary vocational training o¤ered by the rms. The idea behind the programmes is that unemployment among low skilled workers is higher than unemployment among skilled workers. Consequently, increasing the number of skilled workers by o¤ering them vocational training should decrease the total unemployment rate. However, the programmes may crowd out ordinary vocational training, thereby reducing a potential negative impact on the unemployment rate.
Evaluating the impact of programmes providing training, requires a more thorough analysis of what inuences young peoples choice of working or going to school. We set up a theoretical search model of young peoples choice between school and work. According to the human capital investment theory, the decision of whether to enter the labour market immediately or to acquire further education post compulsory school, is a matter of whether the costs exceeds the benets of further education, or the reverse.
Furthermore, we keep alternative wages for programme participants xed in the sense that they are not determined by bargaining and hence a change in the workers fall back position has no impact on wages and thereby unemployment. As this paper presents an analysis primarily about the group of young unemployed people who have not (yet) received any kind of education beyond compulsory school, it may be reasonably to assume that the minimum wage plays an important role when deciding to acquire education or search for a job. If the minimum wage is high, the opportunity cost of education is high and young people are more likely to search for a job than to acquire education.
Nickell and Van Ours (2000) analyses the Dutch and British cases. We now describe
what have happened in Denmark. Denmark has experienced a larger fall in unemployment during the same period than England and the Netherlands. We therefore give a short description of the policy implemented in Denmark in the nineties, even though some of the same elements may be found in the policy conducted in other countries.
Since 1994 the Danish unemployment rate declined. The Danish youth unemployment rate has declined since 1993 and more dramatically than the overall unemployment rate.
From 1994 to 1998 the overall unemployment rate decreased with 46 percent, from 12.3 to 6.6 percent. In comparison, the youth unemployment rate decreased with 62 percent, from 11.1 to 4.2 percent. Until 1993, the youth unemployment rate where higher than the total unemployment rate, but since 1993 the ordering was reversed. The gab between youth and the total unemployment rates has increased since then. In 1994 a labour market reform was implemented in Denmark. This reform aimed at increasing the number and the speed with which the long-term unemployed (with more than 6 months of unemployment) were activated. In 1996 a reform directed towards the unemployed, low-educated youth was implemented, the Youth Unemployment Programme (YUP), involving both a carrot and a stick. The aim of this reform was to improve the employment possibilities for unemployed, low-educated youth by motivating them to undertake an education. Young insured persons, less than 25 years, without any formal education beyond secondary school, who have been unemployed for minimum 6 months during the last 9 months, are given an o¤er of 18 months specially designed vocational education. This is the carrot.
This o¤er contains an incentive to undertake ordinary education or to nd a job since unemployment benets are cut by 50 percent while in the special education programme. This is the stick. Refusal to participate in the special education programmes is followed by a sanction, it will result in a total loss of unemployment benets. We disregard this sanction e¤ect, as it is empirically unimportant, see the discussion below.
Jensen et. Al. (1999) study the immediate e¤ect of the implementation of the YUP on the transition rate out of unemployment. They examine the time young individuals spend unemployed, and the states they enter after unemployment. The main result of their analysis is that the transition rate from unemployment to schooling signicantly increases due to the YUP. The increase is mainly due to a direct programme e¤ect, including both enrollment for the specially designed and ordinary vocational training.
The e¤ect of YUP on the transition rate from unemployment to schooling is to a smaller extent due to a sanction e¤ect. They do not nd any signicant e¤ects on the transition from unemployment to employment.
From this analysis, emerge one basic question. Could the decrease in unemployment and, in particular, the decrease in youth unemployment, be due to the implementation of specic designed YUPs, that is, programmes involving a carrot and a stick? In answering this question, we have to take into account the possibility of a complete elimination of any e¤ect of YUPs if the increased fraction of skilled workers through active labour market programmes is fully counteracted by a decrease in the number of workers acquiring skills through ordinary vocational training.
We concentrate on ordinary vocational training, as this should be a perfect substitute for the YUPs, we here consider. If an individual chooses to search for a job instead of enroll in an education programme, he or she might end up unemployed, receiving unemployment benets. We assume that being unemployed, the unskilled individual has a probability of being placed in a programme (according to the YUPs described above).
The group of young people who have undertaken either specially designed or ordinary vocational training search for jobs as skilled workers. However, in order to capture the possibility that the rms do not acknowledge the (potential) resulting skill acquisition of the programme participant but rather still consider him or her as being unskilled after the ended training, we include a section on this issue.
The decision of whether to undertake ordinary vocational training or search for a job is based on maximization of the lifetime utility. Lifetime utility depends upon a number of variables. The income while attending school or working inuences the decision.
The employment prospects also inuences the schooling decision. Research shows that higher unemployment rates imply that a larger fraction of the young people undertake an education, see for example Fredriksson (1999) , Belzil and Hansen (1999) and Riphan (1999) . This result is in accordance with the human capital investment theory. Among other things, the cost of education is the income lost while spending time on education.
When unemployment is high, the opportunity cost of education is low. When weighting the future expected utility against the present (dis) utility of either go to school or work, the expected employment level specic to ones education level is also highly relevant.
Besides the straight economic incentives, we incorporate an individual factor in the utility functions, measuring ability and/or social background.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we set up the model. Section 3 is concerned with the impact on unemployment, the training decision and sector division and total unemployment from a higher rate of being o¤ered programme participation.
Section 4 provides an evaluation and Section 5 considers the case where the programmes do not result in any skills provision for the workers. The last section concludes.
The Model
When a young person enters the labour force, this new worker has several possibilities.
However, in order to focus on the impact of youth labour market programmes, we simplify these possibilities such that the worker only has one decision. The worker decides whether he or she wants to remain unskilled or obtain ordinary vocational training. The vocational trained worker is a skilled worker. We assume that some workers are more able to acquire skills through vocational training, whereby obtaining skills is less costly for those individuals. Hence, workers are heterogeneous. We assume that workers are uniformly distributed between zero and one, ¹ 2 (0; 1), where a higher ¹ corresponds to a higher ability to obtain skills. The costs of acquiring skills through ordinary vocational training are c(¹), where c (¹) < 0.
The unskilled worker having decided to remain unskilled applies for a job in the sector providing unskilled jobs and the unskilled worker having decided to apply for vocational training applies for such a training job. Wages for unskilled workers are indexed to skilled sector wages.
After a period of unemployment, unskilled workers are o¤ered participation in active labour market programmes providing vocational training, whereby the worker becomes a skilled worker.
The market for training jobs is not explicit in the model.
Matching
Let u j ; j = n; s be the rate of unemployment and v j ; j = n; s is the vacancy rate for unskilled and skilled workers, respectively. The matching functions are given by:
x j = x (u j ; v j ) ; j = n; s:
The matching function satises the same properties as a neoclassical production function and is homogenous of degree one. The labour force is normalised to unity. The workers transition rates into the two sectors can be expressed as f j = xj u j = x (µ j ) ; j = n; s where µ j ; j = n; s is labour market tightness for the two sectors. The transition rate facing rms is given by q j = x j v j = x ³ µ j´; j = n; s.
The unskilled worker
For an unskilled worker, let U n ; P n ; and E n denote the expected present values of being openly unemployed, programme participant and employed.
An unskilled worker, who has decided not to acquire skills faces asset equations of the form:
rP n = gbw n ¡ t +°(U s ¡ P n ) ¡ c (¹) ¡ aP n ;
where r is the subjective rate of time preference assumed to be identical for rm and
worker. E i n denotes the value of match i and w i n is the associated wage. The parameter ¼ is the probability of being o¤ered programme participation, in which case the worker receives a fraction, g, of the unemployment insurance received as openly unemployed, bw n , where 0 < b < 1; 0 < g # 1 and w n is the expected wage for unskilled workers. Whenever the unskilled worker is o¤ered programme participation, the worker has some ability costs associated with this form of skill acquisition, c (¹).We let¸denote the separation rate from ordinary employment. The parameter t is a lump sum tax rate. Refusal to participate in a programme results in a total loss of unemployment insurance, and hence we assume all workers agree to participate. We implicitly assume that the value of receiving unemployment assistance is smaller than the value of programme participation.
We do acknowledge that this may not be the case, however, in order to keep focus on the skill acquisition decision this is an appropriate assumption. The parameter a is the rate by which the worker exists the labour market. This is then compensated for by an inow of a workers into the labour market per unit of time.
Transition rates into ordinary employment depend on labour market tightness for unskilled workers, f n (µ n ). At the rate°; the programme ceases, corresponding to the worker being a skilled worker. The programme participant does not search for a job. Figure 1 illustrates labour market ows, where e n is employment in the unskilled sector and e s is employment in the skilled sector.
The wage is indexed to the skilled sector wage, w n = Áw s , Á < 1. Wages are lower for unskilled workers than for skilled workers. Higher skilled sector wages result in higher unskilled sector wages.
! As unemployment benets are indexed to wages, skilled unemployment is not dependent on worker productivity as labour market tightness for skilled ! This may at rst glans seem not to be an appropriate assumption for Denmark where there is no minimum wage for unskilled workers. However, the unskilled sector wage is often negotiated by the union and in that way related to skilled sector wages. Hence this is a simplifying assumption for Denmark and an appropriate assumption for many European Countries. workers is not dependent on productivity. Hence, without minimum wages, the relation between labour market tightness and thereby unemployment will be indeterminate. In order to ensure than unskilled workers accept job o¤ers we need that rE i n > rU n , where a su¢cient condition is that Á > r + a.
Let J i n denote the present value of a lled job from match i and V n denotes the present value of a vacant unskilled job. Labour productivity for an unskilled worker is y n . The cost of holding a vacancy open is k n = ½y n . That is, we let hiring costs be proportional to marginal productivity. The rms transition rate from having a vacant to having a lled job is q n . The ow values of having a lled and a vacant job are then determined by 
We assume free entry, whereby in equilibrium V n = 0. From equation (4) and (5) we obtain an equation to determine labour market tightness, once wages are determined:
½y n q n (r a +¸) = y n ¡ w n ; (6) where r a = r + a. . The rst order condition yields:
The skilled worker
Substituting from equations (7)- (10) and noting that free entry implies V s = 0 we
The skilled sector wage increase with worker bargaining power, worker productivity, unemployment insurance and labour market tightness. The latter e¤ect stems from the saved hiring costs when the match is formed. Skilled sector wages do not depend on the rate at which unskilled workers are o¤ered programme participation, ¼.
Wages are higher in the skilled sector than in the unskilled sector, w s > w n , as Á < 1.
An increase in Á therefore corresponds to a reduction in wage dispersion.
Labour Market Tigthness in the Unskilled Sector
We substitute for wages and hiring costs in equation (6) 
Labour market tightness in the unskilled sector is a function of parameters and labour market tightness in the skilled sector. The parameter ¼ does not appear as unskilled sector wages are related to skilled sector wages. Hence, there is no direct impact on labour market tightness from more programme participation.
Note that for given skilled sector wages, higher unskilled sector wages, that is, a higher Á; results in lower labour market tightness in the unskilled sector.
Labour Market Tightness in the Skilled Sector
Labour Market tightness is determined by using the equations (9), (10) 
Note that if we had bargained wages for the two sectors, and no interaction in-between the two sectors, then labour market tightness would be independent of productivity and therefore equal for the two sectors. It follows that unemployment would be the same for the two sectors. The reason it that hiring costs and unemployment insurance are related to productivity.
Training decision and Sector Division
When deciding on training, the worker is comparing the values of unemployment as a skilled worker to the value of unemployment as an unskilled worker. While obtaining vocational training, the worker is receiving a wage. We assume that an unskilled worker deciding to obtain ordinary vocational training can do that immediately, without any searching period and that the worker deciding to acquire skills, actually do obtain the training and becomes a skilled worker.
"
The marginal worker,1, will then be indi¤erent between acquiring skills and remaining unskilled, implying the value of unemployment as a skilled worker deducted training costs is equal to the value of unemployment as an unskilled worker:
where c(¹) ra is the value of skill acquisition per training period and noting that U n is also a function of ¹. For existence of a nontrivial solution,1 > 0; we need that at ¹ = 1; U s > U n and then as ¹ decreases, c (¹) increases and U n increases. Hence, U n > U s for ¹ <1 and the reverse.
Substituting from the equations (1) to (3) and (7) and (8) 
where ª s = ((ra+¸+fn)(ra+°)+¼(ra+¸)) (ra(ra+¸+fn)(ra+°)+¼(ra+¸)°) and ª n = ((b(ra+¸)+fn)(ra+°)+¼(ra+¸)gb) (ra(ra+¸+fn)(ra+°)+¼(ra+¸)°)
. When the wage di¤erence between the skilled and the unskilled sector is large, Á small, this will tend to increase the number of people acquiring ordinary vocational training.
Workers with ¹ #1; choose not to acquire skills, whereas workers with ¹ >1 acquire skills. There is a continuous ow of a workers into the labour force and a continuous ow of a workers out of the labour force. The labour force is normalised to one. The sector division, without any active labour market programmes providing vocational training " This is, of course, a simplication. However, in order to focus on whether increased programme participation implies lower unemployment or not, we wish to avoid unnecessarily complications of the model. would therefore be1 unskilled workers and (1 ¡1) skilled workers. However, in order to obtain the equilibrium number of skilled and unskilled workers, we have to take into account the number of workers obtaining skills through active labour market programmes,°u p . Hence,1 ¡°au p and 1 ¡1 +°a u p resolve the unskilled and skilled labour forces, respectively.
We observe that a nontrivial solution exists if the following condition is satised:
The condition is always satised. Thus, a positive number of workers will acquire ordinary vocational training.
Unemployment
Unemployment has to be separated into di¤erent groups. Unskilled workers may be openly unemployed or programme participants. There is a continuous ow of a workers into the labour force and a continuous ow of a workers out of the labour force.
In equilibrium inows are equal to outows. The equilibrium ows characterizing the labour market for workers are then: e n +1a = (a + ¼ + f n ) u n ; u n f n = e n (a +¸) ; 
where
Total unemployment is:
Total openly unemployment is given by:
This paper will be concerned with openly unemployment, which we denote unemployment from now on, for simplicity. This is, the right measure for unemployment, as programme participation is a transitory state before skills are obtained and the workers become skilled workers. 
which is true if f s > f n :
A higher employment probability in the skilled sector tends to decrease unemployment in this sector relatively to the unemployment rate in the unskilled sector. A higher employment probability in the unskilled sector tends to decrease unemployment for unskilled workers relatively to unemployment for skilled workers. However, empirically we observe that the unemployment rate for unskilled workers is higher than the unemployment rate for skilled workers. This requires that skilled workers transition rate is higher than unskilled workers transition rate, f s > f n and thereby that labour market tightness is higher in the skilled sector than in the unskilled sector. As seen from equation (15) this in turn requires that the relative marginal productivity is lower than the relative wage of the unskilled sector, i.e. it requires:
yn ys < Á = wn ws : We assume this to be the case, as a relatively high unemployment rate for unskilled workers is the most realistic set up. #
Comparative Statics
The aim of this section is to evaluate what happens to unemployment, training, sector division and total unemployment, when the probability of getting an o¤er for programme participation increases. The idea is that more people should obtain skills and as the unemployment rate for skilled workers is lower than the unemployment rate for unskilled workers, total unemployment should fall. However, as the YUPs may crowd out ordinary vocational training, the number of skilled workers may actually decrease and thereby cause an increase in unemployment. The government budget constraint is: As shown below, u n may increase or decrease with ¼ through a direct impact and an impact on1, depending positively on1. The variable u s depends on ¼ through an impact on s. The expenditure side may increase or decrease with ¼. The government budget constraint is always fullled through adjustments of the lump sum tax, t, paid by all workers.
As noted above, wages and labour market tightness are not a¤ected as higher ¼ has no impact on skilled sector wages and thereby unskilled sector wages. # Furthermore, if this was not the case, there would be no scope for ghting the problem of unemployment by introduction educational programmes.
Unemployment
By inspection of equation (19) and (17) together with (21) we observe that the unemployment rate for skilled workers, us es+us and the unemployment rate for unskilled workers, un e n +u n are both una¤ected by an increase in ¼.
Corollary 1Unemployment rates for skilled workers and unskilled workers are una¤ected by more people being o¤ered programme participation.
The total number of unskilled unemployed workers may decrease due to more people being o¤ered programme participation. But the relevant number to consider, the rate of unskilled unemployment is not a¤ected. This is so as the rate of being o¤ered programme participation, ¼; has no impact on labour market tightness for unskilled workers. Labour market tightness for unskilled workers depend on skilled sector wages, which are not dependent upon ¼. Therefore labour market tigthness in the skilled sector is independent on ¼ and the unemployment rate for skilled workers does not depend on the rate of being o¤ered programme participation.
Intuitively this must be true. Moving into a transitory state of programme participation, and hence withdrawing from the labour force, should not a¤ect the unemployment rate for unskilled workers. Furthermore, increasing the number of skilled workers through programme participation does not in the present set up, in equilibrium, have any impact on unemployment for skilled workers. 
Training Decision and Sector Division
The subsection is concerned with the impact on sector division from more workers being programme participants, that is, resulting from an increase in ¼.
Proposition 2When the rate of being o¤ered programme participation increases, that is, ¼ increases, the number of people acquiring ordinary vocational training increases (decreases), 
where D = (r a (r a +¸+ f n ) (r a +°) + ¼ (r a +¸)°).
We can show that a su¢cient condition for d1 d¼ < 0 is that ra(1¡gbÁ) the faster the unskilled nish the education programme and become skilled workers, the more likely it is that programmes crowd out ordinary education. The relative compensation while in programme, g, measures the stick-e¤ect. The smaller the stick, that is the larger is g, the more likely it is that programmes crowd out ordinary education.
Note that a decrease in the number of people acquiring ordinary vocational training requires that the value of programme participation is larger than the value of unskilled unemployment, such that unskilled workers are better o¤ when ¼ increases.
The e¤ect of an increased frequency of being o¤ered programme participation on the relative number of skilled workers may be positive or negative. The relative number of skilled workers is given by:
If a higher frequency of being o¤ered programme participation crowd in the number of people acquiring ordinary education, d1 d¼ < 0, this has a direct positive e¤ect on the relative number of skilled workers. There is further an indirect e¤ect through the equilibrium pool of programme participants. The equilibrium pool of programme participants is given by:
There is a direct positive e¤ect on the equilibrium pool of programme participants and thereby on the relative number of skilled workers. This result says that if a higher frequency of being o¤ered programme participation crowd in the number of people acquiring ordinary education, d1 d¼ < 0, the relative number of skilled workers unambiguously increases. However, even if a higher frequency of being o¤ered programme participation crowd out the number of people acquiring ordinary education, d1 d¼ > 0, the relative number of skilled workers increases if the fall in the number of people acquiring ordinary education is not too high.
Total Unemployment
In this section we examine what happens to total unemployment when the rate at which a worker is o¤ered programme participation increases. The aim of the specially designed active labour market programmes is to decrease unemployment, through an increase in the relative number of skilled workers. According to equation (21) the unemployment rate of skilled workers is lower than the unemployment rate of unskilled workers if the transition rate into skilled employment is higher than the transition rate into unskilled employment. Empirically, we observe that the unemployment rate for unskilled workers is higher than the unemployment rate for skilled workers, accordingly we assume that the inequality f s > f n is fullled, see condition (15).
The total unemployment rate we consider, is a weighted average of the unemployment rates of skilled and unskilled workers respectively. The unemployment rates of skilled and unskilled workers are not a¤ected by an increase in the rate of being o¤ered programme participation. However, if the relative number of people acquiring education, ordinary and through the special programmes, increases, the total unemployment rate unambiguously decreases. Even if the relative number of skilled workers decreases, the total unemployment rate may decrease, as the e¤ect of reducing the number of unskilled unemployed workers through programme participation is higher than the temporary reduction of the labour force. The following proposition summarizes the results. The rst term of the numerator of equation (24) has two parts. If the relative number of skilled workers increases (decreases), this tends to decrease (increase) unemployment.
Furthermore, a higher rate of being o¤ered programme participation directly reduces the number of unemployed unskilled workers. If the relative number of skilled workers do not decrease, the number of unemployed unskilled workers decreases.
The second term in the numerator of equation (24) captures the impact on the number of unemployed skilled workers. If the number of skilled workers increases, then this will increase the number of unemployed skilled workers. The last term in the numerator of equation (24) corresponds to the change in the labour force due to more people being o¤ered programme participation. If the equilibrium pool of programme participants increases, the labour force is reduced and therefore tends to increase the unemployment rate. A higher rate of being o¤ered programme participation directly increases the number of programme participants. If, however, the YUPs do not totally crowd out ordinary education, i.e. if the relative number of skilled workers increase, @s @¼ > 0, this tends to decrease the number of programme participants. Hence, in the case preferred: the number of skilled workers increases, the total e¤ect on the number of programme participants is ambiguous.
The total e¤ect of a higher rate of being o¤ered programme participation on the total unemployment rate, is unambiguously negative if the relative number of skilled workers do not decrease, i.e. if This condition corresponds to a condition on the magnitude of crowding out of ordinary education implied by a higher rate of being o¤ered programme participation.
In the case where the number of workers acquiring ordinary skills increases, that is, a higher rate of being o¤ered programme participation crowds in ordinary education, this unambiguously implies that the number of skilled workers increases and total unemployment falls. On the other hand, even if a higher rate of being o¤ered programme participation crowds out ordinary education to an extent implying that the relative number of skilled workers decreases, % All numb ers are from The danish employer organisation. & Here we should note that there is an upward limit on b in Denmark, which is probably reached by many skilled workers. Hence, b is ab ove :$"# for unskilled workers. However, we assume bn and bs to b e equal for simplicity and symmetry.
Evaluation
However, the assumption that all workers attending an active labour market programme resulting in the acquisition of skills, is a simplifying assumption which need not hold. Many workers may initiate participation but nd an unskilled job or give up the specially designed educational programme before graduating. Furthermore, rms may not acknowledge that the government trained worker has the same qualications as an ordinary trained worker. This last issue we turn to in the next section.
What if the training part doesnt work
Until now we have assumed that the training provided by the government through Active Labour Market programmes has the same quality as the ordinary vocational training (which may include some elements of public funding too, of course). However, it may the case that the government provided training is not acknowledged by skilled sector rms as having the same quality as the ordinary vocational training mainly provided by rms. We have considered the one extreme where the two forms of training are perfect substitutes. In this section, we consider the other extreme case which captures that skilled sector rms are not interested in employing a government trained worker. Another interpretation could be that no programme participants nishes the total training programme. Hence, programme participants end up returning to the unemployment pool as unskilled workers instead of transferring to a state as skilled sector unemployed workers. The carrot is missing, only the stick is at work. We have that s = 1 ¡1, the number of people acquiring ordinary skills is equal to the number of skilled workers.
What happens in this case is quite straight forward. The description of the model is basically the same, except from that equation (2) .
Existence is easily shown. It is immediately observed that a higher ¼ implies that1 decreases as the value of being an unskilled unemployed worker decreases with ¼ :
When the probability of being o¤ered programme participation increases, the unskilled worker is worse of as only the stick remains, inducing more workers to acquire skills. Note, however, that even if g = 1 (or slightly above) we still have a positive impact on skill acquisition. This is the case as the programme participation reduces the value of unskilled unemployment as there is no possibility to search for a job while programme participant.
Hence, if g is less than one it just amplies the negative impact on the value of unskilled unemployment.
Concerning unemployment, we have the following equations: Hence, whenever the training programmes do not work, that is, they are not perfect substitutes for ordinary vocational training, ' then the stick e¤ect implies crowding in, that is, more workers are acquiring ordinary skills, resulting in a reduction in unemployment.
Conclusion
This paper has evaluated the impact of specially designed active labour market programmes aiming at providing the worker with vocational training in order for him or her to become a skilled worker. As the unemployment rate is higher for unskilled than for skilled workers, more programme participants should increase the fraction of skilled workers and thereby reduce the rate of unemployment. For example, Denmark has o¤ered such youth educational programmes to young unskilled workers including a carrot and a stick, the carrot being skill acquisition and the stick being a reduction in unemployment insurance.
However, including an endogenous skill choice decision we have taken into account that a higher rate of being o¤ered programme participation may reduce the number of people acquiring skills. If remaining an unskilled worker searching for a job and having the possibility of being o¤ered programme participation is associated with a higher value than obtaining ordinary vocational training, the number of workers obtaining ordinary vocational training may decrease. In this case, an aggregate reduction in the number of skilled workers may be the result and unemployment could increase.
We have shown that if the time spend in programmes is long, then programmes do not crowd out ordinary education. But even if programmes crowd out ordinary education, the fraction of skilled workers may increase and unemployment is reduced. We cannot tell whether this has been the reason behind the reduction in the Danish unemployment rate. To answer this question, further empirical tests are needed. In general, if the programmes should be successful in any economy, the stick part of the programme is important; unemployment insurance should be reduced to some extent while the worker is a programme participant. Simple simulations suggests that the programmes have crowded out ordinary vocational training but that this has happened jointly with an increase in the fraction of skilled workers in the economy, hence leading to a reduction in total unemployment.
Furthermore, we have evaluated the impact of the programmes when they have no e¤ect on the workers skill level. In this case, only the stick part is e¤ective and unambiguously inducing more workers to acquire ordinary education. However, comparing the two cases, the case with and the case without the carrot part e¤ectively working, is not straightforward. When the carrot part is e¤ective, we may see a reduction in the number of workers acquiring ordinary skills but at the same time there is a direct increase in the number of skilled workers through the government provided programmes. When the carrot is not e¤ective, the number of workers acquiring ordinary education is increased but there is no direct increase in the number of skilled workers through the government provided programmes.
